How Much Autonomy Do You Want?
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How much legal autonomy—and how much exemption from otherwise
applicable laws—ought religious groups to have? When government
grows larger and more ambitious, laying down the law in more and more
areas of life, these questions arise more often and more urgently.
It is a common motif that without some special accommodation or
exemption from various laws, it would be difficult for religious
communities or even individuals to live religious lives.1 If public law
forbids employment discrimination on the basis of religion, for example,
religious groups have an obvious claim for exemption when choosing
their clergy and a claim for autonomy to decide who qualifies to be a
rabbi, priest, or pastor.2
The controversy in recent months over the Obama Administration’s
mandate to Roman Catholic institutions over abortive drugs and
contraception is just one example of the almost limitless situations in
which the question of special accommodation can arise.3 Should Native
American or Rastafarian sects be exempted from drug laws that forbid
peyote or marijuana? Should Mormons or Muslims be exempted from
laws against polygamy? Should Christian Scientists be exempted from
*
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1. See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 556 (1991); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992) (noting that even critics consider
“accommodation” the “central motif of religion clause thought”).
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The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 391–93, 396–97 (1987).
3. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
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laws requiring parents to provide for medical treatment for sick
children? Should Sikhs be exempted from laws prohibiting carrying
knives in public? Should observant Jewish soldiers or officers be
exempted from military uniform rules that would not permit wearing a
kippah (head covering)? Should religious individuals be exempted from
duties that would otherwise be required on the job, such as a nurse who
refuses to assist abortion or contraception, a police officer who refuses to
arrest antiwar or antiabortion protesters, or postal workers who refuse to
deliver mail that they consider blasphemous, or—as is now an issue in
Israel—who refuse to deliver pamphlets proselytizing for Christianity, or
who refuse to deliver military conscription documents?
In the United States, these questions—as with so many things in American
life—are often framed as constitutional issues. The First Amendment
says “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”4 So perhaps some or all of the
claims for religious exemption must be granted in order to satisfy “free
exercise.” On the other hand, if they are granted, people who might want
to smoke peyote, marry polygamously, and/or carry ceremonial but sharp
knives in public for nonreligious reasons are prohibited from doing so,
and this can be said to be an “establishment of religion”: it would
certainly discriminate in favor of religion and against people who might
want exemptions from the law for secular—but perhaps for serious or
conscientious—reasons. Free exercise and establishment, especially if each
is construed broadly, notoriously threaten to collide with one another.
The U.S. Supreme Court has followed a notably up-and-down course
in recent decades about special religious accommodation. In two famous
cases decided in 1963 and 1972, the Court held that the First Amendment
requires exemptions from generally applicable federal and state laws
unless there is a “compelling state interest”—or something close to it—
for enforcing the law: a constitutional standard that usually means the
government has to give way to a claim under the Bill of Rights. The
first case, Sherbert v. Verner, involved a Seventh Day Adventist who
wanted an exemption from a requirement to be available for work on
Saturday as a condition of receiving unemployment benefit;5 the second,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, involved an Amish community that wanted its
children excused from compulsory school attendance past the eighth
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grade.6 The Court held that Free Exercise requires a religious exemption
in both cases.7
But in 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court
reversed course and said that the Free Exercise Clause does not require
religious exceptions from generally applicable laws that are enacted for
secular purposes.8 The idea clearly implicit in the decision is no official
preference for religion over nonreligion.9 The U.S. Congress reacted
sharply to the decision by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA), seeking to restore the pre-Smith “compelling state
interest” standard that favored religious exemptions.10 In 1997, the
Supreme Court struck back and struck down RFRA as unconstitutional
on the basis that Congress has no power to impose this pro-exemption
requirement on the states.11 Recently, in yet another turn, the Court tacitly
upheld RFRA for religious exemptions from federal laws—although
Congress cannot require such exemptions from state laws.12
In practice, there has been less change in public policy toward religious
exemptions than a reading of the somewhat dizzying Supreme Court
decisions might suggest. In the era before Smith, exemptions were by no
means granted as readily as Sherbert and Yoder might imply, and after
Smith they are still available in various guises. Even in the post-1960s but
pre-Smith era, the Supreme Court rejected all religious claims for exemption
from tax laws and from all claims arising from prisons and the military,
and it also rejected a claim for exemption from the Fair Labor Standards

6. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
7. Id. at 234; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. Justice William O. Douglas’s provocative
dissent in Yoder suggested that a high school child may or may not want to be “harnessed”
for life to the Amish community: “He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an
oceanographer. To do so, he will have to break with the Amish tradition. . . . The child,
therefore, should be given an opportunity to be heard before the State gives the
exemption which we honor today.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 244–46.
8. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
9. See id. at 890.
10. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2012).
11. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
12. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 439 (2006) (holding that under RFRA the federal government can only seize and
preclude the use of an otherwise illegal substance for religious ceremonial use upon a
compelling state interest).
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Act.13 Virtually the only claims the Court accepted were, like Sherbert,
for religious exemption from requirements to be available for Sabbath
work under unemployment benefit laws.14 And after Smith, religious
claimants still sometimes win in the Supreme Court. For example, the
Court says that where the government actually considers individual
eligibilities—as it does in unemployment cases—it still has to grant
religious exemptions.15 The Court also strikes down laws that it finds to
be discriminatory against particular religions or their practices, such as,
in a famous case, animal sacrifices by the Santeria sect.16
Perhaps more importantly, federal and state laws—even, or especially,
after Smith—have been strongly favorable towards religious exemptions.17
RFRA was enacted by unanimous vote in the House of Representatives—
better than the Declaration of War after Pearl Harbor—and by almost
unanimous vote in the Senate,18 and it still applies to the federal government,
requiring religious exemption unless a “compelling government interest”
militates against it.19 About half the states have enacted their own RFRAlike laws or interpreted their state constitutions in RFRA-like terms.20
Twenty-three states and the federal government allow sacramental use of
peyote.21 Congress granted the Amish an exemption from social security
taxes after the Supreme Court turned it down.22 Congress granted members
of the armed forces the right to wear religious apparel after the Supreme

13. See William P. Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry Exception
to the Criminal Law, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 239, 244 (2011).
14. Id. at 244–45.
15. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981).
16. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527,
546 (1993).
17. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 466–67 (2010). Smith and the ensuing Supreme Court
decisions are about whether religious exemptions are required as a matter of free
exercise by the Constitution. But federal or state statutes are free to grant more “special
accommodation” than the Constitution—minimally—requires, so long, of course, as the
special accommodation is not viewed as rising to the level of an establishment of
religion.
18. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1) (2012).
20. See Eugene Volokh, 1A. What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:43 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/02/1areligious-freedom-restoration-act/.
21. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 912 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22. See 26 U.S.C. § 3127(a) (2012); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261
(1982).
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Court turned down a claim by an Air Force doctor, an observant Jew, to
wear a kippah on duty.23
Some of these enactments might really give cause for second thoughts,
even if one supports generous religious exemptions. The federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964, for example, prohibits employment discrimination
on account of race, religion, sex, or national origin.24 But under a 1972
amendment, religious corporations and institutions may discriminate on
the basis of religion.25 The original 1964 law had allowed such religious
discrimination more narrowly, only in relation to religious activities.26
The Supreme Court upheld the broadened exemption in the case of a
gymnasium—open to the paying, not necessarily praying, public—
operated by the Church of Latter Day Saints, which fired a janitor for
failing to live by Mormon standards of religious practice.27 This exemption
from antidiscrimination law is not merely for a few religious groups or for a
narrow range of religious employees. Religious organizations employ
more than a million Americans, and religious bodies can have large-scale
business interests with a lot of leverage over would-be employees.28
Churches own, or have owned, a major secular news agency, the United
Press International; the largest beef ranch in the United States; and a
major life insurance company.29 With the broad, or overbroad, exemption,
there is the potential for enterprises owned by religious bodies to swallow
the antidiscrimination law, at least in some localities or in some trades.30
Meanwhile, there have been increasing calls in recent years both in the
United States and in other Western democracies, not merely for religious

23. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2012); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510
(1986).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
25. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972) (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255
(1964)).
26. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964).
27. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987).
28. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Amos: Religious Autonomy and the Moral Uses of
Pluralism, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACIES 165, 186 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
2000).
29. Id.
30. See generally id. at 183–87 (arguing that broadened religious accommodation
of employers under the amended provisions of Title VII undesirably enables the use of
economic power to compel adherence to religious practice).
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exemptions from secular laws but also for actual power to adjudicate
under religious law. 31 There are already steps in this direction with
binding arbitration in religious courts: halakhic or Sharia tribunals, for
example, created by Jewish and Muslim groups respectively.32 An
extensive network of batei din, or rabbinical arbitration courts, now
exists in the United States.33 More recently, Islamic groups have called
for the establishment of comparable Sharia courts.34 With such tribunals,
business people can contract to arbitrate future disputes in a religious
court or a couple might sign a prenuptial agreement to arbitrate family
disputes, including divorce, under religious law.35 Going further, there
have been suggestions in the academic literature that insular or selfcontained religious groups might be given public judicial powers by
analogy to the powers of tribal courts on Indian reservations.36 The
Archbishop of Canterbury recently provoked a flurry when he called, in
somewhat general terms, for aspects of Islamic Sharia law to be adopted
in Britain.37 The role of religious courts in Israel is sometimes cited as
an example of how religious adjudication might function in a democratic
society.38
In a sense, even special accommodation or religious exemption from
secular law implies that religious groups must have some autonomy and
power to decide—in a more or less formal sense, to adjudicate—relevant
questions by their own standards: to decide, for instance, at what age
Mennonite children should leave school, which day is the Sabbath and
what are the rules of Sabbath observance, what apparel is religious
apparel, what use of peyote is sacramental, and so on.

31. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
14, 149 (2001) (supporting expanded “jurisdictional autonomy” for religious and cultural
minorities); see also Donald Brown, A Destruction of Muslim Identity: Ontario’s
Decision To Stop Shari’a-based Arbitration, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 495 (2007)
(arguing against the Province of Ontario’s ban on judicially-enforced religious
arbitration). For a more extensive review of these controversies, see Michael A. Helfand,
Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011).
32. See Helfand, supra note 31, at 1248, 1250.
33. Id. at 1248.
34. Id. at 1250.
35. See id. at 1253.
36. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Radical Possibility of Limited CommunityBased Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927, 942–43 (2002).
37. Helfand, supra note 31, at 1237–38.
38. See generally Daphna Hacker, Religious Tribunals in Democratic States:
Lessons from the Israeli Rabbinical Courts, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 59 (2011–2012)
(demonstrating that the Israeli Rabbinical courts can serve as a valuable example for
theoretical debates regarding religious tribunals in liberal states).
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The prospects for actual state—or federal—religious courts in the
United States comparable to the Israeli religious court system, are slim,
to put it gently, given separation of church and state under the First
Amendment.39 But to the extent that halakhic or Islamic arbitration
awards are enforceable in the secular courts, such religious judgments
can have binding force under American law.40 Supporters of religious
multiculturalism and increased autonomy for religious groups have
suggested that the usual rules of arbitration law should be relaxed for
religious tribunals.41 For example, Professor Michael Helfand, in an
erudite essay, suggests that whereas a standard arbitration award is
unenforceable if a court finds it to offend “public policy,” a religious
arbitration should be enforced by the secular courts unless the judgment
is “unconscionable.”42 Moreover, a religious arbitral decision, unlike the
typical secular arbitration, should presumptively be enforced even if it
prejudices “third-party interests”—the interests of anyone other than the
actual parties to the arbitration.43 But one such third-party interest
potentially among quite a few others that would apparently be discounted is
the interest of liberal society in avoiding a tendency toward group
separatism and balkanization that might be implicit in this policy.44 And
quite apart from whether unconscionablity and against public policy are
two almost interchangeably vague forms of words, it might appear that
Professor Helfand is trying to have it both ways, that is, both to empower
religious courts to impose judgments that would otherwise not be enforceable
and yet to reserve the right not to enforce an ill-defined category of
religious decrees that judges, or Professor Helfand, might be sufficiently
offended by as to declare unconscionable.
Another able advocate of legal multiculturalism, Professor Mark
Rosen, might be less open to the charge of having it both ways.45 In a
series of articles, Professor Rosen has explored—and implicitly or explicitly
endorsed—how radically power might be devolved to “insular” or
“perfectionist” groups, notably religious groups.46 One model cited by
39. See Rosen, supra note 36, at 952.
40. Helfand, supra note 31, at 1281.
41. See id. at 1283, 1292 (citing SHACHAR, supra note 31, at 68–87, 117–45).
42. See id. at 1288–1300.
43. See id. at 1304.
44. See id. at 1275–76.
45. See Rosen, supra note 36, at 1009.
46. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of QuasiConstitutional Federal Law: Of Tribunal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69
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Professor Rosen is the power given to tribal Indian courts on federal
Indian reservations.47 Some of these tribal courts have virtually unreviewable
power, by treaty or by statute, to interpret the rights of tribal Indians “in
light of [the tribe’s unique] needs, values, customs, and traditions.”48
These values, as construed by the tribes’ leaders, include “bolstering the
traditional respect that is to be accorded to tribal leaders.”49 In many
instances where tribal courts diverge from standard American law it is in
a purportedly communitarian direction, curtailing individual rights as
normally construed under the Constitution or under otherwise applicable
law.50 The normative question, of course, is whether greatly enhanced
adjudicative autonomy for an indefinite number of “insular” groups would
be worth the potential costs in terms of authoritarianism within such
groups and separatism or balkanization within the broader society.51
On the other side, opposition to religious courts—in particular to the
spread of Islamic Sharia law—has also grown.52 Oklahoma adopted a
FORDHAM L. REV. 479 (2000); Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution:
Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1129 (1999); Mark D. Rosen, The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist
Religious Groups in a Liberal State, 1 J. LAW, RELIGION & STATE 16 (2012) [hereinafter
Rosen, Educational Autonomy]; Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community SelfGovernance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal
Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1998); Rosen, supra note 36.
47. See Rosen, supra note 36, at 933–34.
48. Id. at 936–37.
49. Id. at 938.
50. See id. at 1001–02.
51. Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 46, at 35–41. In a recent article,
Professor Rosen suggests that “perfectionist” groups should be eligible for selfgoverning “regulatory authority” in a liberal society, provided that (1) they have a
peaceful disposition toward their nonperfectionist neighbors and do not seek to compel
others to live in accordance with their views of the good; (2) those raised in religious
perfectionist communities are educated to respect the essentials of liberal society—this
requirement to be understood “modestly” so as not to interfere with religious autonomy
“unnecessarily”; and (3) members of the religious communities retain some right to opt
out—this, too, to be understood modestly lest it dilute the power of the group, a “softer
opt-out” meaning no more than the absence of physical restraints against would-be
defectors or perhaps merely the knowledge that there exists a different world out there.
See id. This is a thoughtful and nuanced article, but it seems to me that Professor Rosen
greatly underestimates the separatist and socially fragmenting tendencies that such
autonomy for religious perfectionist communities would foster over time and also the
potential for abuse and petty—or not so petty—tyranny by the empowered authorities of
such groups over their members. For an example of how newly granted group autonomy
can promote separatism and social break up, see Charles King, The Scottish Play,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 113, an account of how “devolution” of power to
Scotland beginning in the 1990s after many centuries of union fostered a separatist
independence movement virtually nonexistent at the outset of devolution that now
seriously threatens to break up the United Kingdom.
52. See Helfand, supra note 31, at 1232–33, 1238.
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referendum in 2010, subsequently struck down by the federal courts,
forbidding state courts to consider Sharia.53 At least six other states have
considered similar measures, which might forbid state courts from enforcing
the judgments of religious arbitral courts.54 Along the same lines, after
public statements by an Islamic leader in Toronto that only “bad” Muslims
would fail to submit their disputes to Sharia arbitration panels,55 the
Canadian province of Ontario now bans the enforceability of religious
family law arbitration.56 In the words of the Premier of the province “There
will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all
Ontarians.”57 But despite occasional rebuffs, halakhic tribunals and their
caseloads—and Muslim interest in Sharia tribunals—have grown in the
United States in recent years.58 It remains an open question to what
degree and on what terms the secular courts will accept and enforce their
judgments.
The attractive side of increased religious autonomy is fairly obvious.
Generous exemption from secular laws and increased availability and
enforceability of religious adjudication all provide a framework for
people to live more religious lives, under religious law if they choose.59
These developments empower religion accordingly. They might seem
especially well suited to nomocentric or law-intensive religions like Judaism
and Islam.60 After all, Jews are obliged under Jewish law, at least under
appropriate circumstances, to adjudicate disputes before halakhic courts
and not to turn to secular tribunals.61
53. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1116–18, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012); see also
Helfand, supra note 31, at 1233 (describing the November 2010 Oklahoma amendment).
54. See Helfand, supra note 31, at 1239.
55. Khalid Hasan, Sharia Debate Rages On in Canada, DAILY TIMES (Aug. 31,
2004),
http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/31-Aug-2004/ShariaSharia-debaterages-on-in-canada.
56. Helfand, supra note 31, at 1237 & n.30.
57. Id. at 1237 (quoting Associated Press, Ontario Will Ban Shariah Arbitrations,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/international/americas/12
canada.html?fta=y&_r=0).
58. See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2013).
59. See Helfand, supra note 31, at 1275.
60. See id. at 1247–52.
61. See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Gittin 88b. But see Babylonian Talmud,
Tractate Sanhedrin 23a. See generally Yaacov Feit & Michael A. Helfand, Confirming
Piskei Din in Secular Court, 61 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC’Y 5 (2011); J. David
Bleich, Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: Litigation and Arbitration Before
Non-Jews, TRADITION, Fall 2000, at 58. Of course, Jewish law does not, because it cannot,
prescribe to what extent—if at all—non-Jewish secular courts will enforce halakhic
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When religious autonomy is enshrined in secular law, however, there
are potential and actual problems and drawbacks as well. In the first
place, the substance of religious law may be at odds with the values of a
liberal society. This arises most obviously on the numerous points where
Jewish or Islamic law, for example, are inegalitarian as between men and
women. Divergences from liberal norms can arise in religious commercial
law and in other areas as well. For example, it may conflict with federal
and state antitrust laws in the United States for batei din or rabbinic
arbitration tribunals to enforce the halakhic principle of hasagat gevul,
which restricts competitive business practices that might put an existing
business out of business.62
A plausible response to this sort of concern is that a liberal society is
pluralist and does not require everyone to live by liberal norms—indeed
that it would be illiberal to do so. So long as there are ample choices and
full freedom to affiliate and disaffiliate, and so long as the interests of
third parties are not compromised, liberal society should not be offended
if some people and groups, including religious groups, voluntarily opt
for non-liberal ways of life. In the case of hasagat gevul, this runs into
the objection that third parties are compromised—that the purpose of
antitrust and of public policy favoring competition is to promote lower
prices and better quality goods and services for everyone because the
public suffers whenever there is less competition.63
As for respecting people’s free choice to submit to religious law, the
more readily secular courts enforce religious arbitral judgments, the more
this implies scrutiny by the courts into just how voluntary, and how fully
informed, the parties were when they consented to religious adjudication.
Religious communities might feel such scrutiny intrusive, both as to the
community pressures—which in practice are often intense—that undoubtedly
affect whether people agree to religious adjudication, and also as to how
much—or how little—the parties might know in advance about the
interpretive or ideological leanings or commitments of particular religious
tribunals.
There is also a concern, in terms of social cohesion, about the balkanizing
effects of group autonomy, especially where religious groups, identity
groups, or other groups inspiring deep passion and commitment are
involved. This concern traces back to Hobbes and Locke, who wrote during
or just after a period of religious civil war and it has been a perennial

arbitration judgments in cases where the losing party does not submit voluntarily to the
judgment.
62. See Simcha Krauss, Hasagath Gvul, 29 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC’Y 5
(1995).
63. See id. at 6, 10.
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worry in the history of liberal thought.64 The apprehension, of course, is
that when such groups are empowered, it tends to diminish their members’
loyalty to, or even involvement in, the broader liberal community. If
things go too far, it threatens to begin pulling liberal society apart. This
concern has reemerged sharply in Western European countries in recent
years, where Muslim communities have grown, and where Islamic or
Islamist leaders have achieved a degree of autonomy under multicultural
policy. The concern, of course, is that group differences, far from shrinking,
are growing more intractable and more threatening as a result of these
policies.
If religions are granted exemption and autonomy that others might not
be granted, there is also the ever more uncertain question of who or what
is a religion. When Will Herberg’s famous book Protestant Catholic
Jew appeared in the 1950s, it was broadly true that those were the three
religious alternatives in America—with subdivisions among each of
course, but each with a recognizable identity as well— and a broad
consensus about what is a religion, such that Americans could feel that
they would know it when they saw it.65 Today it would be fair to say
that there is an ever-expanding psychic shopping mall of religious,
semireligious, and quasireligious beliefs, notions, groups, and ideologies.
In American prisons, for example— not an entirely representative subset
of the country, to be sure—there has been dramatic growth in adherence
to a variety of sects including the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims);
pagan groups such as Wicca, Odinism, Asatru, and Druidism—often
associated with White Supremacists among the prisoners; and Native
American spirituality.66 An American court today may confront not only

64. See, e.g., RICHARD BOYD, UNCIVIL SOCIETY: THE PERILS OF PLURALISM AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 56–59, 96–101 (2004).
65. See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT CATHOLIC JEW 38–39 (Anchor Books rev.
ed. 1960) (1955).
66. For the religious situation in prisons, see U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
E NFORCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PRISON (2008), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs
/STAT2008ERFIP.pdf, especially the statement of Commissioner Gail Heriot at 118.
For a statistical survey of American religion generally, see THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION
& PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY (2010), available at http://religions.pewforum.
org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf. The Pew Forum survey summarized that
religious affiliation in the United States is both very diverse and extremely fluid. More
than one-quarter of American adults (twenty-eight percent) have left the faith in which
they were raised in favor of another religion or no religion at all. Id. at 5. If change in
affiliation from one type of Protestantism to another is included, forty-four percent of adults
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the question of whether an Air Force doctor who is an observant Jew
may wear a kippah on duty but also a case of a free exercise claimant
who asserts that his religious beliefs require him to dress like a chicken
when going to court.67
If religions are granted exemption from otherwise applicable laws and
even a degree of autonomous authority, there is an obvious temptation
for all sorts of groups to claim to be religions and to demand special
privileges and powers. A well-known but by no means unique example
is the Church of Scientology, which began as an entirely secular marketing
enterprise founded by the science fiction writer L. Ron Hubbard but went
on to claim religious status, partly in hopes of a tax exemption.68 Despite its
considerable criminal history by then, Scientology was eventually granted
tax exemption in 1993 as a bona fide religion.69
There is a further point, which perhaps deserves more emphasis than it
sometimes receives. If the state offers a significant degree of religious
autonomy—power over jobs, resources, and decisions that affect people’s
lives—it can encourage the take-over of religious communities by
authoritarian and factional religious leaders. This may partly be due to
the attraction that autonomous power might have for the most enthusiastic
people within a religious group or its leadership, who may tend to be the
most extreme people. But autonomy has a perverse logic of its own,
which more directly encourages extremism: namely, if autonomous rulings
are not going to differ from the rules of secular, liberal society, then why
is it important that the religious group should have autonomy? Whereas
the more radically the group’s rulings do differ—including the rulings of
religious arbitration courts—the more necessary and justified the claim
for autonomy. Once there is autonomy, in other words, there is liable to
be a cascade effect towards more distinctive, which is to say more extreme,
positions on the part of the autonomous institutions and those who steer
them, if only to vindicate the idea that autonomy is necessary in the first
place.
The religious courts in Israel are a cautionary example in this context.
The State of Israel, as is also the case with many Muslim-majority

have either switched religious affiliation or dropped any connection to a specific religious
tradition altogether. Id.
67. Compare Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding prohibition of
the kippah), with State v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. 1985) (quashing a contempt
citation and remanding to the trial court for further consideration of the religious claim
for the chicken costume). In effect, the kippah lost and the chicken costume, at least
tentatively, won.
68. See HUGH B. URBAN, THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY: A HISTORY OF A NEW
RELIGION 3, 17, 160 (2011).
69. Id. at 3.
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countries, maintains a religious court system within the state framework
with jurisdiction over family law including marriage and divorce and
related questions of personal status—even who can be buried in a Jewish
cemetery.70 The religious courts trace back to the Millet system under
the Ottoman Empire where the phenomenon of Balkanization originated
and was kept on under the British mandate in Palestine and again after
the establishment of the State in 1948.71 It is common knowledge in Israel
that the religious courts have increasingly been taken over by haredi
(ultra-Orthodox) rabbinical judges in recent years.72 The consequences
of this are dramatically divisive in Israeli society.73 The immigration of
more than a million people from the former Soviet Union to Israel in the
past two decades, in particular, has led to a situation in which there are
hundreds of thousands of people living in Israel—most if not all of them
Israeli citizens or eligible for citizenship—who identify with the Jewish
people but whose matrilineal ancestry is not Jewish or cannot be proved
to be so to the satisfaction of the haredi rabbinate.74 These Israelis and
their children are not recognized as Jews by the religious courts and
cannot marry full-fledged Jews or be buried in a Jewish cemetery.75
Many of them might be willing to undergo conversion to Judaism, but
the religious courts increasingly refuse to accept non-haredi conversions.76
There are notorious cases of the religious courts refusing to issue marriage
licenses where one of the parties is a non-haredi convert to Judaism,77
and the religious courts have even attempted to revoke retroactively

70. See MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 53 (1994);
David Ellenson, The Rock from Which They Were Cleft, JEWISH REV. BOOKS, Winter
2012, at 41, 41.
71. EDELMAN, supra note 70, at 7, 48, 52.
72. See, e.g., Etgar Lefkovits, 12 of 15 New Rabbinical Judges Are Haredi.
Government Blasted for Sacrificing Agunot for Political Survival, JERUSALEM POST, Mar.
20, 2007, at 3, available at 2007 WLNR 5428485.
73. See id.
74. See Ellenson, supra note 70, at 41.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Dan Izenberg, Petitioners Demand Marriage Registrars Recognize
State-Approved Conversions, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 28, 2010, at 1, available at 2010
WLNR 7115001; Matthew Wagner, Declaring Bride’s Conversion Treif, Rishon Lezion
Rabbi Nixes Marriage, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 12, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR
15955457.
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Orthodox but non-haredi conversions and to render Jewish families
abruptly non-Jewish.78
The polarization of religious life in Israel and the growing power of
haredi ultra-Orthodoxy undoubtedly have complex origins and can
surely not be laid to the existence of state religious courts alone. But,
the religious court system and the autonomous power of the religious
“establishment” in Israel have certainly not stopped the drift towards
religious extremism in the Orthodox rabbinic world nor prevented the
estrangement of Jews of various religious tendencies from one another,
both in Israel and abroad.79
Extensive religious autonomy, in short, can lead to the creation—with
state approval—of islands of authoritarianism in an otherwise free and
democratic society. It can also promote corruption of various kinds, which
often accompanies authoritarianism. Corruption, not on a modest scale,
has certainly been one of the issues in Israel in the context of religious
legal autonomy and political power.
A consideration of these various problems, both actual and potential,
with religious autonomy is not to suggest that religious exemptions from
secular law and a measure of a religious autonomy are simply undesirable.
On the contrary, they may be indispensable for religious people and
groups to be free to live religious lives. Special accommodation of religious
needs under secular law and arbitral alternate dispute resolution in
religious courts may actually work reasonably well if there is a degree of
moderation on all sides. If the government authorities are basically
respectful towards religious concerns, which they generally have been in
American history,80 if a rough consensus about who and what is a
religion does not break down in a welter of opportunistic or unhinged
78. See Marc D. Angel, Diaspora Letter: Conversion Crisis, HADASSAH MAG.,
Nov. 2008, at 16, 16; Zvi Zohar, From Periphery to Core, 10 CONVERSATIONS 93
(2011). For an account of a case in which the rabbinic court purported to revoke a
conversion, see SUSAN WEISS ET AL., THE INTERROGATION OF THE CONVERT “X” BY THE
RABBINICAL COURTS IN ISRAEL (2010), available at http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/down
loadFile.cfm?FileID=11652. The Center for Women’s Justice in Jerusalem is active on
behalf of converts entangled in such cases and posts about recent developments. See
News and Updates, CENTER FOR WOMEN’S JUST., http://www.cwj.org.il/en/news (last updated
Oct. 23, 2014).
79. See Isi Leibler, The Radicalization of the Haredi World, JERUSALEM POST,
Mar. 26, 2014, at 13, available at 2014 WLNR 9549631.
80. See, e.g., Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917) (repealed
1918) (providing exemption from combatant duty for members of religious organizations
that forbid its members to participate in war); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92
(2005) (allowing a monument of the Ten Commandments to be displayed on Texas State
Capitol grounds); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that the government may not require a child to salute the flag in violation of his
religious beliefs).
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claims, and if religious groups themselves do not seek to abuse either the
host society or their own members, then there is the prospect of a reasonable
balance of interests. All this presupposes a degree of social cohesion
and good faith, of course: that all concerned should be “touched . . . by
the better angels of our nature.”81
Relying on everyone being touched by the better angels of our nature,
unfortunately, can sometimes be uncertain. It is all the more uncertain in
a fractious and polarized society, such as America has perhaps increasingly
become. At root, the questions of special accommodation and religious
adjudicatory independence arise most urgently when a government
grows in its reach and ambition. After all, if most areas of life, including
those that touch on religious life, are left to people’s private arrangement,
then not much special accommodation will be necessary. But when
government takes control over more and more areas of life, regulating
who shall do what and under what rules and conditions, then clashes with
one or another religious way of life are almost inevitable. The dispute
over government mandates to provide abortive drugs and contraception,
in the framework of increasing government control and possible takeover of
health care in America, is merely a well-known recent example.82 With
a relatively open market in health care and private health insurance, religious
institutions needed no special exemptions to adopt their own approaches
on questions of contraception and abortion as on other matters. But
greatly increased government regulation implies more uniform standards
and rules and hence more controversy over whether there should be
religious exemptions, and if so, for whom, to what degree, and on what
terms.
Special accommodation for religion and special adjudicatory powers
are problematic for reasons I have tried to suggest. In the long run,
especially under less than favorable social circumstances, they might not
be workable. If not, then society may ultimately have to choose between
big government—an ever-growing and ever-more-powerful administrative
and redistributive state—on the one hand, and lively religious pluralism
and thriving religious life on the other. This, it seems to me, and not the

81. JOINT CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO GEORGE
BUSH 1989, S. DOC. NO. 101-10, at 141 (1st Sess. 1989) (quoting Abraham Lincoln’s
March 4, 1861 inaugural address).
82. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
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dubious panaceas of religious exemption and group autonomy, is what
religious people and groups ought to fix their attention on.
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